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Abstract  
The initial public offering (IPO) leads to significant growth in firm size as well as 
access to greater pools of capital available through the public markets, conceivably 
allowing public firms to devote ever-greater resources to pursuing innovation. This 
study seeks to discover how firm innovation is affected by an IPO, hypothesising that 
firms in fact become less innovative after going public due to increases in information 
asymmetries and potential for agency conflict between managers and investors. 
Managers are less inclined to pursue risky, uncertain, and long-term innovation 
projects in part because of the short-term, profit sensitive nature of unsophisticated 
and passive public equity investors. This is in contrast to the active role pre-IPO 
venture investors play in managing, controlling, and directing the firm, which lowers 
information asymmetries and potential for agency conflict. For this reason, these 
investors are better suited to distinguish between good and bad innovation projects, 
understanding the trade-offs between short-term profitability and long-term value 
building achieved through innovation. This study takes an empirical approach to 
testing the hypothesis, gathering data on patent grants (used as a proxy for 
innovation) for 202 US firms in the biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and medical 
supplies industries that went public between 1979 and 2002. The findings of the 
statistical analysis generally support the hypothesis, and suggest that the IPO acts 
as a brake on the growth trajectory of innovation in the years preceding and 
immediately following the IPO. Therefore, this study concludes that the IPO has ex-
post negative effects on firm innovation.  
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1. Introduction  
The initial public offering (IPO) represents a major milestone for a firm. By facilitating 
liquidity it enables early investors to exit, rewarding them for the long-term and risky 
investment they made in an often young, innovative, and unproven firm. Among the 
several possible exit events, including acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, and 
liquidation, IPOs harbour the greatest upside in terms of potential return-on-
investment (Cumming & Johan, 2008).   
Early-stage equity investments, in part incentivised by an exit event, are critical in 
providing funding for the growth of new ventures. The earliest investments are 
generally made by the entrepreneurs themselves, as well as their friends, family, and 
business associates. After several years, the pool of potential investors expands to 
include angel investors and venture capitalists (VCs), who generally have the 
resources to provide greater capital to early-stage firms (Fluck, Holtz-Eakin, & 
Rosen, 1998). VCs, who in the US invest largely in high-tech, early stage companies 
(Black & Gibson, 1998), are a critical component of a vibrant innovation system. 
Despite VCs accounting for 3% of innovation investment in the US between 1983 
and 1992, those investments generated 8% of innovative output, suggesting VCs are 
an efficient source of innovation financing (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). Most critically, 
VCs and their fellow early stage investors provide growth capital for young, 
innovative firms who would generally be unable to raise capital through traditional 
means, such as bank loans, because of the intangible, risky, and uncertain nature of 
innovation investments (Hall, 2010), coupled with the inherent risk in early-stage 
companies. Black & Gibson (1998) argue that a well-developed public stock market 
that provides an avenue for early-stage investor exit is necessary for a vibrant VC 
market, and thus for funding early stage innovation. Absent the potential for an IPO, 
the capital required by young firms to produce new knowledge, technologies, and 
innovations would be less prevalent. This suggests that IPOs have ex ante positive 
benefits on innovation.  
The research question posed by this paper is what ex post impact does the IPO have 
on firm innovation? It seems logical that after going public firms should become more 
innovative because of enhanced capital resources. Firms on average triple in size 
(Carpenter & Petersen, 2002) through funds raised from the public issue, and this 
capital often does go to increasing investments in innovation, in the form of research 
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and development (R&D) spending, in the years immediately following the IPO (Kim & 
Weisbach, 2008). Additionally, firms gain continued access to public markets where 
they can commence further equity issues, and in theory funding should always be 
available for net present value projects in perfect capital markets (Fluck et al., 1998). 
Therefore, firms that go public gain access to greater pools of resources internally 
and externally, which should conceivably contribute to improved innovative output.  
This paper hypothesises that, in fact, firms become less innovative following an IPO 
despite access to greater resources. This is largely because capital markets are 
imperfect, especially in the context of the unique, idiosyncratic, and risky nature of 
R&D investments. These investments are characterised by the prevalence of 
information asymmetries and potential for agency conflicts between investors and 
managers. The IPO exacerbates these issues due to changes in ownership structure 
away from active private equity investors to passive public equity stockholders. The 
nature of R&D investment, characterised by a lack of tangible collateral as well as 
risk and uncertainty, raises the cost of capital and makes external capital and bank 
loans a prohibitively expensive and unlikely source for R&D investment financing 
(Hall, 2010). Beyond raising the cost of capital, information asymmetry and potential 
for agency conflict reduce a firm’s ability to pursue innovation in a variety of ways. 
Public-equity investors generally have shorter time horizons, less access to 
information, and greater potential for divergent interests between themselves and 
management, inhibiting and even disincentivising management’s discretion to 
conduct R&D (Bharath & Dittmar, 2010). Lack of information leads owners and 
potential investors to judge firms on relatively rudimentary and short-term metrics like 
quarterly earnings (Rappaport, 2005), pressuring managers to make decisions that 
increase short-term profitability at the expense of long-term investments. Further, 
managers become myopically fixated on increasing stock price, reinforcing a focus 
on short-term profitability rather than long-term value building (Stein, 1989). Passive 
investors who lack expertise in the technological basis of R&D investments are also 
poor judges of the long-term value of these projects, and find it difficult to distinguish 
between good and bad R&D projects (Hall, 2010).   
Prior to going public, managers and investors experience relatively minimal 
information asymmetries and potential agency conflicts because of the nature of 
private equity investments, which are in general long-term, illiquid, and undertaken 
by investors with knowledge of the technology and industry in which the firm 
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operates (Wright & Robbie, 1998). This confers positive benefits in terms of pursuing 
innovation as managers and investors can share a long-term approach to building 
firm value rather short-term profitability, including understanding of how R&D 
projects will positively or negatively contribute to building that value. Therefore, pre-
IPO firms will have more freedom to pursue risky and uncertain, but potentially highly 
valuable R&D and innovation projects that are not as acceptable to investors of 
public firms, or even as appetising for managers in these public firms who are judged 
on earnings benchmarks and profitability.  
This study takes an empirical approach to testing the hypothesis. Using patent grants 
as a proxy for innovation, 202 US firms in the biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and 
medical supplies industries are observed, beginning three years prior to the IPO 
through nine years after to determine how innovation output changed over time. The 
choice of industry focus is necessary to reduce potential internal validity issues due 
to the utilisation of patents, as these industries place greater emphasis on patenting 
as a method for appropriating value from innovation (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; 
Arundel, 2001). Measuring these industries limits the potential that a shift in 
patenting strategy is being measured, rather than changes in real innovation output.  
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that preceding the IPO, through the first 
three to four years following it, innovative output grows rapidly. However, thereafter it 
begins to stagnate and decline slightly. This suggests, though not contributing to a 
sizable decline in innovation, the IPO functions as a braking mechanism on 
innovation growth, which does not keep pace with firm growth after going public. 
Therefore, based on the empirical research presented here, the IPO does appear to 
have a negative effect on the pursuit of innovation within firms.  
This paper begins with a review of the literature to examine prior research that 
approaches a similar research question, as well as to develop the theoretical 
framework that informs the hypothesis. The literature review includes how 
information asymmetries and potential for agency conflicts impact the pursuit of 
innovation and R&D, how these issues are relatively minimised prior to the IPO, and 
how the post-IPO environment exacerbates them. The methodology chapter follows, 
outlining the expected outcomes of the statistical analysis, justification for the 
industry specific focus, and results of the regression models. This is followed by a 
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discussion of the results, limitations, suggestions for future research, and a 
conclusion.  
2. Literature Review  
This study will discover whether firms in a pre-IPO, private equity environment are 
better suited for conducting R&D and producing innovative outputs than in a post-
IPO, public equity environment. In the following section the nature of innovation and 
R&D investments will be discussed, as will prior literature conducted on this research 
question, followed by literature that informs the theoretical and empirical framework 
for the hypothesis presented by this paper. This will provide context as to where the 
empirical research conducted in this study fits into the broader literature surrounding 
ownership structure, investment, and innovation.  
2.1. The Nature of Innovation and R&D  
Innovation is primarily achieved through R&D investments, generally in the form of 
salaries for qualified researchers and engineers. Output from these investments is 
largely an intangible asset, namely knowledge, embedded in the human capital that 
created it. When this human capital exits the firm, the knowledge created through 
R&D investment exits with them. R&D is risky, uncertain, and costly, and when 
successful yields profits in the long-term, coming at the expense of short-term 
earnings. R&D outputs are commonly idiosyncratic and difficult to salvage value from 
if unsuccessful (Hall, 2010). This makes innovation investments unique to alternative 
forms of capital investments.  
March (1991) identifies the explicit choice firms make between allocating scarce 
resources towards exploring new knowledge (i.e. innovating), and exploiting existing 
knowledge (i.e. leveraging prior knowledge/innovations). Exploration carries 
uncertainty and risk, and yields benefits in the long-term. Exploitation is relatively 
more certain and has capacity to generate profits in the short-term. Thus, pursuing 
exploitation too heavily and to the detriment of exploration confers short-term 
benefits, but is harmful in the long run and can lead to stagnation within the firm. 
How IPOs and subsequent changes in ownership structure affect the allocation of 
resources between pursuing exploration and exploitation form the basis of my 
research.  
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2.2. Public/Private Ownership and Innovation  
Following the leveraged buyout (LBO) wave of the 1980’s, Lerner, Sorensen, & 
Strömberg (2011) sought to measure to what extent the switch from public to private 
ownership form affects long-term investment, and R&D in particular. The debate they 
address, and which will be addressed in greater detail in coming sections, is whether 
or not the private organisational form relieves managers of public shareholder 
pressures that encourage short-term profit building at the expense of long-term value 
building, exemplified by investments in R&D. Their empirical research discovered 
that following the switch to a private corporate form patenting levels remained largely 
the same, and patent portfolios became more focused in areas where the firm 
previously specialised. They conclude that switching to the private form has no 
consequences on overall innovation-intensity, and generally cultivates a refocusing 
of innovation strategy on the firm’s previous expertise.  
Lerner et al., (2011) sheds light on the issue of innovation in a public versus private 
environment, but their findings are limited generally and in terms of applicability to 
the research objective of my paper in several key areas. First, strategic utilisation of 
patents as a method of innovation value appropriation varies by industry (Levin et al., 
1988; Cohen et al., 2000). Lerner et al. (2011) lacks a focus on industries that place 
relatively greater importance on patents as a method for capturing value from 
innovation, thus their results do not account for potential shifts in patenting strategy 
when a firm is taken private. Second, while they do provide insight into the nature of 
private versus public ownership forms and how it effects on innovation, they looks at 
a shift in the opposite order to my empirical research. Third, their time frames (three 
years prior through two years following the LBO) are relatively short, and may not 
reflect the time it takes to renew innovative capacity. Finally, the innovative pre-IPO 
firms in my analysis are generally associated with different types of private equity 
investors than LBO firms, namely the entrepreneur and their friends and family, 
angel investors, and venture capitalists (Fluck et al., 1998; Prowse, 1998). VCs, for 
example, typically invest in new ventures, and generally do not take majority control.  
Private equity firms associated with LBO’s, on the other hand, buy mature firms 
using a small amount of equity and a large amount of debt, and generally take 
majority control of the firm with a narrow focus on profitability (Lerner et al., 2011). 
Private equity in general confers positive benefits on innovative capacity, such as 
less information disclosure, as compared to public equity (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2014).  
  7 
However, the structure of LBO’s, with high degrees of leverage and investments in 
mature firms, varies greatly from pre-IPO VC investments in fledgling, younger 
companies (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008). Empirical research, for example, finds that 
greater degrees of leverage result in lower levels of innovation (Hall, 1990, 1994), 
which potentially limits positive benefits in terms of enhanced innovation output 
brought by the switch to a private ownership structure.  
Ferreira, Manso, & Silva's (2012) model for private versus public ownership structure 
and firm incentive to invest in innovation suggests that private organisational forms 
are optimal when pursuing exploration because insider-investors can time the market 
and choose an early exit strategy when they receive bad news, making them more 
failure-tolerant and thus more inclined to invest in uncertain and risky R&D projects. 
Stock prices in public markets, on the other hand, accurately reflect all publicly 
available information. This makes an early exit once bad news is received 
unprofitable, which reduces risk-tolerance in public firms. Further, they suggest 
market prices react quickly to good news, incentivising short-term behaviour — 
meaning public firms are more conducive to pursuing exploitation and short-term 
profitability. The theoretical framework presented by me expands on this argument. 
The intention is to illustrate that pre-IPO private equity reduces information 
asymmetries and potential for agency conflict, leading to longer-term horizons and 
enhanced goal alignment between investors and managers. When uncertainties 
about quality and intended benefits of R&D projects are reduced, investors are less 
risk-adverse and more inclined to fund them.  
Bernstein (2012), and Aggarwal & Hsu (2014) directly address the research question 
posed in this paper, comparing differences in patent citations (as a metric for 
innovation quality and level of novelty) between firms that conducted an IPO and 
firms that withdrew a planned IPO. Their findings support the hypothesis presented 
in this paper, indicating that firms who went public are less innovative than those 
which remained private. Once firms go public, they pursue less breakthrough 
innovations (exploration) and focus more specifically on incremental innovations 
(exploitation). Bernstein (2012) proposes an incentive shift as one underlying factor 
for this reduced innovative output, suggesting that inventors who experience 
ownership dilution, and thus have less of a claim on the monetary reward of their 
inventive outputs, face weaker incentives to pursue novel innovations, supported 
empirically by evidence that inventors who remain with the firm experience a decline 
  8 
in patent quality. Further, following the IPO there appears to be an exodus of 
inventors leaving the firm, though this is partially mitigated by the firm’s ability to hire 
new inventors.  
Aggarwal & Hsu (2014) take a similar approach to Bernstein (2012), with some 
distinctions. Their data sample includes exclusively venture-capital backed 
biotechnology firms, and they measure firms acquired through a merger and 
acquisition process (M&A) for comparison with firms that conducted an IPO. Their 
findings suggest a decline in patent applications for both IPO and M&A firms, the 
former’s decline more pronounced. Further, firms acquired through an M&A by a 
private firm maintained relatively greater innovation quality than those acquired by 
public firms. Their results support their theoretical assertion that information 
disclosure is the root cause of innovation declines following an IPO or M&A. Private 
equity requires less public disclosure, therefore details of product or service 
innovations remain hidden from competitors, conferring greater competitive 
advantage in pursuing innovation. Conversely, public firms must make public 
disclosures, forfeiting the opportunity to be secretive and thus reducing their 
competitive advantage.  
This paper is unique to prior research of Bernstein, (2012) and Aggarwal & Hsu, 
(2014) in several ways. First, a longer post-IPO data collection period will be 
measured in order to determine whether declines in innovation are temporary. 
Further, despite a similar industry focus as Aggarwal & Hsu (2014), my study 
expands beyond biotechnology into the pharmaceutical and medical supplies 
industries. Finally, my paper will base its conclusions on changes within firms that 
conducted an IPO, rather than between firms who completed and who withdrew their 
IPO. This controls for factors that potentially influence decisions to withdraw an IPO 
that could also influence innovation intensity.1 For instance, market conditions and 
economic downturn inhibits innovation spending in the aggregate (Filippetti & 
Archibugi, 2011), as well as deters firms from conducting an IPO because of threat 
of undervaluation (Loughran & Ritter, 1995).  
                                            
1 Both studies consider changes within firms pre- and post-IPO. However, their conclusions 
stem from differences between completed and withdrawn IPOs. Regardless, their results can 
be compared to the empirical results found in this study.  
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Kim & Weisbach (2008) found that firms generally increased R&D spending following 
an IPO, suggesting that IPOs are motivated by a desire to finance capital 
investment. Further, Cohen & Klepper, (1996) found a positive correlation between 
firm size and R&D intensity. Conversely, Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales (1998) found 
that Italian firms decrease investment following an IPO, and the underlying 
motivation behind the IPO is to exploit overvaluation of similar firms in their industry. 
Further, much empirical research (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Hall, 2002, 2010) 
suggests that external equity financing is much too expensive for firms to utilise in 
financing R&D due to several factors which will be discussed in further detail shortly. 
As such, firms rarely make use of external debt or equity to fund innovation, 
suggesting that the IPO is an anomaly in externally financing R&D, and indeed 
Carpenter & Petersen (2002) point out that firms seldom conduct further equity 
issues following the IPO. Therefore, in the short-term an IPO likely enhances 
innovation because of increased resources that can be devoted to R&D. However, 
observing long-run patterns will potentially yield different results.  
A further point is that Kim & Weisbach (2008) measured R&D inputs, rather than 
innovative outputs (Fang, Tian, & Tice, 2013). Thus, while IPOs lead to increases in 
R&D spending, other forces potentially hamper the effectiveness of this increased 
investment. This is perhaps due to inventor incentives, as proposed by Bernstein 
(2012), or negative effects on innovation due to information disclosure, as proposed 
by (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2014). In the following section, the role of information 
asymmetries and agency conflict will be discussed in reducing incentives to pursue 
or optimise R&D projects and innovation.  
2.3. Ownership, Information Asymmetry and Agency Conflict  
Following an IPO, firms on average treble in size (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). This 
opens greater pools of capital to fund investment projects, and indeed under a 
neoclassical perfect capital market devoid of friction capital should always be 
available for positive net present value projects (Fluck et al., 1998). This suggests 
that the market should readily fund exploration projects that have positive returns on 
investment. Thus, because of greater liquidity and access to capital, a post-IPO firm 
would have greater resources available to conduct R&D. However, this perfect 
capital market model has been challenged in recent years (Carpenter & Petersen, 
2002). Market friction does exist largely because of two factors: information 
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asymmetries and potential for agency conflict (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Hall, 
2002, 2010). These concepts form the theoretical basis for the hypothesis posed in 
this research paper.  
Information asymmetries exist where the inventor/entrepreneur has better 
information than potential investors as to the nature and likelihood of success of 
potential R&D projects. Agency conflicts may arise where management is separate 
from ownership and there is potential for goal conflict, for instance where managerial 
freedom to pursue R&D projects is hampered by investor concern that the 
investment is self-serving rather than strategically valuable. Empirical evidence 
suggests these two issues raise the cost of capital for R&D as investors require 
larger premiums where information asymmetry and potential for agency conflict is 
high, limiting firms’ ability to use external capital to finance R&D. Therefore, public 
equity is largely limited in its usefulness for innovation investments, with firms more 
reliant on internally generated funds for these types of investments (Carpenter & 
Petersen, 2002; Hall, 2002; 2010).  
The hypothesis presented in this paper contends that reducing information 
asymmetries and agency conflicts not only reduces the cost of capital, but also 
encourages pursuit of innovation. This concept serves as the foundation for the 
remainder of the literature review, which will continue to build a theoretical and 
empirical framework for why firms become less innovative post-IPO. It will be 
established that in toto agency conflicts and information asymmetries are minimised 
pre-IPO relative to post-IPO. These concepts will be applied to existing theoretical 
and empirical literature in order to establish a relationship between them and 
organisational pursuit of innovation.  
2.3.1. Pre- and Post-IPO Ownership Structures  
Information asymmetries and agency issues differ between pre- and post-IPO firms 
due to the difference in the structure and makeup of investors/owners during the two 
periods. Pre-IPO, these issues are limited because private equity investors, 
particularly venture capitalists, take on an expanded role within the firm beyond 
simply supplying capital. Early in a firm’s life equity investments tend to come from 
the entrepreneur themselves, as well as friends, family, and business associates. 
Later in their lifecycle (two to nine years) outside equity investors, specifically 
business angels and venture capitalists (VCs), become increasingly involved. Angel 
  11 
investors are generally high net worth individuals who invest their personal capital in 
young firms. They generally take a variety of hands-on roles within the firm in order 
to reduce information asymmetry and moral hazard as a means of risk reduction 
(Mason, 2007). VCs similarly invest in young, innovative firms, using funds raised 
through several large institutional investors. The VC acts as an intermediary between 
firm and investor, and takes an active role in funding, managing, and controlling the 
firm. They generally receive voting rights and seats on the board of directors, and 
even in some cases take on a managerial position. Prior to investing, VCs conduct 
intensive due diligence on the technology, market potential, characteristics of the 
management team, and financial fundamentals and potential profitability of the firm. 
Further, these investments are illiquid and long-term; often a VC fund has a lifetime 
of ten years and the VC anticipates an exit from the investment somewhere between 
two and seven years (Prowse, 1998; Wright & Robbie, 1998; Cumming & Johan, 
2008; Schwienbacher, 2008). This active role taken by VC investors reduces 
information asymmetries in addition to acting as a governance mechanism, limiting 
potential for agency conflict (Wright & Robbie, 1998). In fact, Amit, Brander, & Zott  
(1998) argue that the VC’s “niche” is specifically in dealing in areas where 
information asymmetry is potentially great, such as in innovative-intensive 
environments, due to their ability to limit information issues that can ultimately lead to 
moral hazard/agency conflicts. Thus, in a pre-IPO environment firms are 
characterised by investor stewardship, including greater degrees of owner-
management, and reduced information asymmetries and agency conflicts, as well as 
a long-term orientation.  
Following an IPO, liquidity increases and ownership becomes increasingly dispersed 
(Kothare, 1997), exacerbating information asymmetries and potential for agency 
conflict (Bhide, 1993). In contrast to a few active insider investors, ownership is 
spread throughout many passive, unsophisticated investors who find it costly to 
gather information on their investments (Bharath & Dittmar, 2010). This lack of 
information leads to increased reliance on short-term benchmarks such as quarterly-
earnings in order to make decisions about investments, in contrast to hard analysis 
such as discounting cash flows (DCF) methods. Though analysts recognise that 
DCF is an appropriate model for evaluating financial assets, the cost and time of 
conducting such analysis, coupled with the fact that they will always have less 
information than insiders, inhibits their ability to produce accurate results, and 
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contributes to the reliance on short-term benchmarks (Rappaport, 2005). Public 
equity investors tend to have limited oversight and control over firms they invest in, 
with little recourse to manage the firm other than through exiting the investment by 
selling their stock (Jensen, 1997).  
2.3.2. The Influence of Investors on Management Decision-making   
Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal's (2005) survey of 401 financial executives discovered 
that a majority believed earnings were the key metric used by external audiences 
and investors to assess their firm, and indicated they would avoid beginning a 
positive net present value project if it came at the expense of the current quarter’s 
expected earnings. Turning back to March (1991), this suggests that a firm’s 
allocation of resources between long-term exploration projects and short-term 
exploitation of existing knowledge is influenced by investor pressures to meet short-
term earnings benchmarks. Jensen (1997, pg.1) asserted that the “publicly held 
corporation… has outlived its usefulness in many sectors of the economy”, in favour 
of the private form of corporate ownership. Because of substantial ownership by 
managers and directors, private firms seek to increase value over share price. 
Information asymmetries and agency issues are reduced in the private ownership 
form, and managers are insulated from share price being the key measure of firm 
performance. Stein's (1989) model suggests that manager concerns regarding share 
price influence them to behave myopically, forgoing long-term investments such as 
R&D in order to boost short-term earnings; the greater the concern about share 
price, the more myopically managers behave.  
It is important to point out that Graham et al.'s (2005) survey included both public and 
private firms, and found similar results regarding short-term pressures between the 
two ownership structures. This certainly questions Stein's (1989) and Jensen's  
(1997) theoretical models, while also challenging an assumption in this paper’s 
hypothesis that private, pre-IPO firms are insulated from these short-term pressures.  
However, several factors limit their finding’s applicability to my research. First, just 
thirty-six private firms were included in their sample. Second, the type of private firm 
studied was not explicit. Many of the assumptions of my hypothesis centre not on the 
private equity ownership structure generally, but specifically on the pre-IPO 
ownership structure and its relative success in fostering innovation. The lack of focus 
on that specific type of firm, obviously not the intended purpose of their study, is 
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limited in assessing the short versus long-term decision making of managers in the 
pre-IPO environment. Regardless, this study is useful in establishing a causal link 
that investors with short-term measurements of firm success impart short-term 
thinking on managers.  
2.4. Effects on Innovation  
Considerable literature exists examining the effects of information asymmetries and 
agency issues on general firm performance and, in some cases, specifically on 
innovation. Examining and synthesising this literature will establish the theoretical 
and empirical framework for my hypothesis and empirical strategy. Specifically, this 
section looks at how information asymmetry and agency conflict impacts innovation 
in firms. These two issues are manifested in a variety of ways, which will be 
discussed, and are often at the heart of previous empirical research that explores 
factors that effect innovation.  
2.4.1. Liquidity  
Firms conduct IPOs with the recognition that benefits of increased liquidity exceeds 
costs of decreased control (Bharath & Dittmar, 2010). Indeed, the driving force 
behind venture capital is a liquidity event, such as an IPO, that allows early investors 
to cash in on their long-term, previously illiquid investment (Zingales, 1995; Ritter & 
Welch, 2002). However, empirical evidence suggests that increased stock liquidity 
has a detrimental effect on innovation (Baker, Stein, & Wurgler, 2003; Fang, Tian, & 
Tice, 2013).  
Illiquidity makes short-term exits difficult for investors (Wright & Robbie, 1998) 
whereas exits from public firms are often the sole governance mechanism an 
investor has at their disposal (Jensen, 1997). Illiquidity incentivises shareholders to 
be proactive in information gathering on firms they invest in. This reduces 
information asymmetries and potential for agency conflict between owners and 
managers, enhancing the investor’s ability to distinguish between good and bad R&D 
projects. Due to their inability to sell in the short-term, investors by nature have a 
long-term focus which confers a long-term focus on managers (Lee & O’Neill, 2003). 
The argument presented here is that increased liquidity has an indirect effect on 
pursuit of innovation by decreasing incentives for investors to take active roles in 
information gathering. Instead, less informed and shorter-term metrics such as 
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quarterly earnings are used to evaluate firm performance, as opposed to in-depth 
analysis of potential risks and benefits of R&D projects that reduce profit in the short 
term, but have the potential to increase firm value in the long-term. This is consistent 
with Fang et al.'s (2013) findings that dedicated institutional investors who actively 
gather information enhance innovative output, as opposed to investors who index 
holdings to short-term metrics that diminish innovation.  
2.4.2. Stewardship  
Kroll, Walters, & Le (2007) argue that, following an IPO, young firms would be better 
served by boards made up of insiders and top management members who share the 
tacit knowledge and entrepreneurial vision of the company and are thus better able 
to oversee the firm. Lee & O’Neill's (2003) cross-country research exploring differing 
R&D intensities between US and Japanese firms illustrates that owner-stewardship 
and reduced information asymmetry and agency conflict positively influence 
innovation. Japanese firms, in contrast to their US counterparts, are characterised by 
concentrated, relationship-based, and relatively illiquid ownership structures, and 
investors take a stewardship role in firms they own, including monitoring and 
controlling firm activities. Their study found greater R&D intensity in Japanese firms, 
and R&D intensity of US firms was positively correlated with ownership 
concentration.  
Applying Lee & O’Neill's (2003) findings to US pre-IPO equity ownership structures, 
the logic would follow that relatively high levels of stewardship by these investors 
would increase R&D and innovative outputs of firms they invest in. While several 
studies have indicated that venture capital is associated with greater levels of 
innovation (Kortum & Lerner, 2000; Popov & Roosenboom, 2009), there is debate as 
to whether this is due to VCs picking already innovative firms, or whether 
stewardship actually improves innovative output (Hellmann & Puri, 2000). However, 
evidence suggests that a correlation exists between the level of firm monitoring and 
control exerted by VCs, and overall success of their portfolios, though not 
necessarily individual firms’ propensity to innovate (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 
2008).   
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2.4.3. Manager Myopia  
Faure-Grimaud & Gromb (2003) assert that public share prices incentivise managers 
to improve that price, as they are likely equity-holders as well. Share price reflects 
only publicly available information, so managers are encouraged to disclose 
information that might lead to an increase in share price. This has implications on 
innovation, as suggested by Aggarwal & Hsu (2014), in that increased information 
disclosure tempers innovation because the competitive advantage of R&D lies 
partially in secrecy. Thus, pursuit of increased share price through information 
disclosure is at odds with investments in R&D, and is reflective of the limitations in 
public markets to reduce information asymmetries in this regard due to the ease of 
imitation of inventive ideas (Hall, 2002).  
Exacerbation of agency problems in public firms is manifested in management 
myopia. Career concerns encourage managers to be risk-adverse and focused on 
short-term earnings to bolster their reputation and decrease the likelihood of being 
fired for wasteful investments and missed earnings targets (Graham et al., 2005; 
Hall, 2002, 2010). Again, this myopia is largely driven by unsophisticated investors 
who rely on short-term profitability to assess firm strength (Rappaport, 2005) and are 
inclined to exit upon bad news (Jensen, 1997), and managers who focus on stock 
price become increasingly myopic at the expense of long-term value building (Stein, 
1989). Pre-IPO, agency issues are reduced because of the active role investors play 
in managing the firm (Prowse, 1998; Wright & Robbie, 1998), which allows for 
greater goal alignment in pursuing long-term value building, a mutual understanding 
of the nature of innovation projects, and less reliance on short-term metrics to 
evaluate firm-investments.  
2.4.4. Dividends and Free Cash Flows  
Jensen (1997) argues that public investor pressure to pay dividends hamstrings a 
firm’s ability to make investments such as in R&D. Reduction of cash flows through 
dividends is employed by investors as a governance mechanism to reduce agency 
conflicts where managers potentially use cash flows to make self-serving 
investments such as luxurious offices or expanding beyond efficient scale (Hall, 
2010). Indeed, private firms pay out less in dividends than do public firms, and the 
more dispersed the ownership of the firm, the more likely dividends are smoothed 
over time (Michaely & Roberts, 2011). Internal financing is most common for R&D 
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investments because of the expense of outside capital and limited availability of debt 
financing (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Hall, 2002, 2010), therefore reductions in 
cash available to management specifically interferes with investments in innovation.  
Though public firms have access to greater pools of resources, rarely do they access 
external financing following the IPO (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002), and a greater 
share of internally-generated capital is paid out in the form of dividends. There is an 
argument to be made that overconfident managers will overinvest in innovation (Hall, 
2010), therefore reducing cash available to managers through dividends prevents 
managers from spending on self-serving projects that create organisational 
inefficiencies (Jensen, 1986). Regardless, the pre-IPO environment should reduce 
this possibility because of the active oversight of the investor.  
2.4.5. Investor Sophistication  
Ferreira et al. (2012) suggest that private firms are able to take more risk and invest 
in R&D projects that are complex, difficult to describe, and untested, whereas public 
firms find it difficult to pursue projects that the market does not understand well. 
Again, Aggarwal & Hsu (2014) suggest that the very need to publicly disclose 
information to the markets will act as a brake on pursuing innovation itself. Thus, 
reduction of information asymmetry is limited in its effectiveness in providing freedom 
to pursue innovation for public firms (Hall, 2010).  
The obvious benefits of keeping information about R&D secret in private firms is 
enhanced by the nature of the investors that early-stage firms disclose information 
to. Venture capitalists tend to focus their investments on specific industries, 
locations, or stages of the investment cycle (Prowse, 1998). Firms pursuing novel 
technologies require investors with expertise in their particular area of technology 
that can assess the quality of a firm’s proposed innovation and make appropriate 
investments, which is the realm of venture capitalists (Tylecote & Conesa, 1999). 
This suggests that the value of information is relative to the capacity of the receiver 
to make sense of it. A VC with a technology or industry focus can make a better 
evaluation of the technology and its capacity to create future value than can a 
passive investor in the public equity market, where the lack of visibility of the R&D 
project can often be perceived as waste and inefficiency (Tylecote & Conesa, 1999), 
making VCs better judges of potential innovation projects. Further, unsophisticated 
investors with limited knowledge and thus highly asymmetric information must assign 
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a higher premium to such projects because of uncertainty (Hall, 2010). Therefore, 
public equity investments in R&D suffer to a greater degree from Akerlof's (1970)  
“lemons” problem, where investors assign a higher price for uncertainty to 
compensate for inability to evaluate potential for success or failure. In other words, 
public equity investors have less ability to distinguish between good and bad R&D 
(lemons) and thus they are less receptive to R&D investments. On the other hand, 
venture capitalists are well suited for weeding out lemons through due diligence prior 
to the investment and their activity in managing and controlling the firm, in addition to 
their technological and market expertise in the area of their investments.  
3. Methodology  
The goal of the following empirical research is to explore whether, and to what 
degree, an IPO impacts the innovative output of firms. The hypothesis, that going 
public negatively affects innovative output, is informed by theoretical and empirical 
research suggesting that information asymmetries and potential for agency conflicts, 
exacerbated by the IPO, enhance short-term and myopic behaviour by managers, 
leading to a decline in the pursuit of innovation. This paper intends to discover 
whether this hypothesis is supported by patenting data, as a metric for innovative 
output, as well as explore the shape of changes in patenting output surrounding the 
IPO. The following section describes the hypothesis and expected outcomes, the 
approach taken to address the hypothesis, how internal validity issues are 
addressed, and the results of the statistical analysis.  
3.1. Hypothesis  
Firms will become less innovative following an initial public offering. 
  
The hypothesis suggests that firms will experience a decline in innovative output 
following an IPO because of enhanced information asymmetry and potential for 
agency conflict between owners/investors, and firm management. It is theorised that 
prior to the IPO, firms should experience growth in overall innovativeness as they are 
plied with equity financing from sophisticated investors who take an active role in 
managing and monitoring the firm, allowing for greater innovative intensity because 
of investor stewardship (Lee & O’Neill, 2003). The decline in innovation should not 
occur immediately, however. Due to the immediate influx of capital from the IPO, 
which Kim & Weisbach (2008) suggests contributes to increased R&D spending, 
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firms will likely see continued growth in patenting output. Further, pre-IPO insider 
directors tend to retain a bulk of their shares for some years following the IPO 
(Franks & Brennan, 1997), suggesting that dispersion and subsequent increases in 
liquidity are gradual, therefore the negative effects of enhanced information 
asymmetry and agency conflict on innovation will also be gradual. However, as these 
issues are enhanced by ownership dispersion, especially away from more 
sophisticated blockholders, institutional investors, and insider directors/owners, 
towards unsophisticated retail investors, coupled with the resulting liquidity increases 
that stem from dispersion (Zheng & Li, 2008), there would be an expected decline in 
innovative output a few years following the IPO.2  
A further time lag issue arises because an investment in R&D does not immediately 
yield a patent, and thus changes in R&D spending may not be immediately reflected 
in patenting output. Hall, Griliches, & Hausman (1986) discovered that there is very 
little time lag between R&D investment and subsequent patent applications, meaning 
that increased investment in R&D should be reflected rather quickly in increased 
patent applications. However, their study observes firms in the US manufacturing 
sector in the 1970’s, and is thus potentially limited in its applicability to the firms 
being in my research. Darby & Zucker (2003) suggest that inventions are patented 
roughly three months following their discovery, however this provides little insight 
into when the investment that enabled that discovery was made. The firms being 
studied here likely have greater time lags relative to others due to the nature of 
clinical trials and the regulatory process in their industries, however research is 
lacking in quantifying what length those time lags might be.  
Regardless, it is likely an unnecessary exercise to attempt to quantify a time lag 
between R&D investments and patenting because innovation is a nonlinear process. 
Linear models would suggest that a scientific discovery or a market demand leads to 
an idea to be researched, developed, manufactured, and then marketed. Instead, 
Kline (1985) suggests a chain-link model of innovation, where there are constant 
feedback loops throughout the innovation process. Thus, one investment might lead 
to several inventions/innovations at various times in the future. Further, modern 
innovation concepts include open innovation, where ideas and knowledge are 
leveraged from a variety of internal and external sources (Niosi, 1999; Chesbrough, 
                                            
2 Zheng & Li’s findings suggest that IPO underpricing is driven by the desire to increase 
liquidity following an IPO, though this is still achieved gradually.  
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2006). Therefore, it is difficult to determine what time lags might be observed 
between investments and patenting. In the context of a chain-link model, R&D 
investment now might be reflected in the shorter-term through a patent, but that 
investment might have longer-term positive impacts as well, where knowledge from 
that original discovery continues to yield new knowledge and subsequent patents for 
several years to come.  
3.2. Approach  
A positivist framework is used to approach the research question, leveraging 
empirical data to determine firm innovation in the years preceding and following an 
IPO. This is achieved using statistical analysis, and specifically regression curve 
estimation models. Aggregating collected data observations, a regression is applied 
to determine the overall innovative output of firms (the dependent variable), prior to 
and following the IPO (where time serves as the independent variables, specific to 
three years before IPO and nine years following the IPO).  
Two regression curve estimation models, linear and cubic, are run in each test. 
Though hypothesised that a non-linear relationship exists, conducting linear curve 
estimations will reveal the overall patenting trajectory, allowing for an assessment of 
the hypothesis that patent output declines following an IPO. The cubic curve fit 
model will reveal a non-linear relationship if one exists, and allows for comparison 
with the linear relationship for model-fit. This method will both determine whether 
patenting output declines, as well as provide insight into the nature of patent output 
over time, allowing for the exploration of how long run patenting activity is affected by 
the IPO.  
The two regression models will measure both the aggregated mean patenting counts 
on a per year basis of all the firms in the relevant data pool, as well as individual 
peryear patent counts. Mean patent data will provide an aggregated overview of the 
overall variations in patenting of the measured sample in order to infer the general 
shift of the group before and after the IPO. However, this presents an ecological 
fallacy that assumes the aggregated mean represents individual patent output. By 
also running individual observations in the regression models, this ecological fallacy 
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can be avoided, and insight can be gleaned on an individual basis. A minimum 
threshold for statistical significance is set at 95%.3  
3.3. Addressing Internal Validity  
In order to operationalise the dependent variable, patent grants are employed as a 
metric for innovation. Acs, Anselin, & Varga (2002) found patents to be a reliable 
measure of innovation, and they are commonly used in empirical research (see: 
Cohen & Klepper, 1996; Kortum & Lerner, 2000; Popov & Roosenboom, 2009; 
Lerner, Sorensen, & Strömberg, 2011; Bernstein, 2012; Fang, Tian, & Tice, 2013; 
Aggarwal & Hsu, 2014).  
The use of patents creates potential internal validity issues, where changes in patent 
counts following an IPO might less reflect a change in innovative output than a shift 
in strategy in appropriating value from firm-generated innovation. For example, 
empirical evidence suggests that firm value is positively correlated to increased 
patent numbers for both early investors such as VCs, as well as for the IPO valuation 
(Heeley, Matusik, & Jain, 2007; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2007). Therefore, pre-IPO firms 
perhaps face greater incentives to patent their inventions than post-IPO firms.4 
Conversely, the high costs of applying for and legally defending patents decreases 
the likelihood that small firms will use patents (Arundel, 2001) and large firms are 
more inclined to patent than smaller firms (Cohen et al., 2000) suggesting a bias in 
the opposite direction.   
Indeed, not all innovations are patented. Arundel & Kabla (1998) found that on 
average 35.9% of product, and 24.8% of process innovations are patented. Firms 
utilise several strategies to appropriate value from inventions, in addition to 
patenting, including secrecy and lead-time. However, prior literature suggests that 
propensity to patent as an appropriation mechanism differs by industry, and 
suggests that medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology firms utilise 
patent to a greater degree than in other industries (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, & 
Winter, 1988; Cohen et al., 2000). Limiting the study to these industries strengthens 
internal validity and enhances confidence that changes in innovative output, rather 
than changes in innovation appropriation strategy, are being measured.  
                                            
3 This statistical threshold is common in the social sciences.  
4 There is a difference between invention (creation of a novel idea) and innovation (practical 
or commercial use of an invention). Using patenting as a metric for innovation insinuates  
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3.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The Osiris database of listed companies was used to develop a comprehensive list 
of US firms in the biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and medical supplies industries 
that conducted an IPO between the years of 1979 and 2002. The measurement 
period ranges from 1976 until 2011, as data is observed for each firm starting 3 
years prior to, and nine years following the IPO. Comprehensive patent data exists 
from 1976 until the present, necessitating the choice of beginning date.5 The 
conclusion date of 2002 allows for the lag time between patent applications and 
patent grants, which takes an average of two years, and nearly all grants are 
approved within three years (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001).6  
Two searches were conducted to target the intended industry-specific firms. The first 
search contained all firms with GICS7 classification standards 352010  
(biotechnology) and 352020 (pharmaceuticals). The second search included all firms 
with US SIC8 codes 283 (drugs), and 384 (surgical, medical, and dental instruments 
and supplies). Two searches were necessary because of lack of consistency in 
industry classifications and the desire to include all biotechnology, pharmaceutical, 
and medical supplies firms. Roughly 10% of results from the Osiris database were 
unusable because of the lack of a clear IPO date.9  
                                            
there is a commercial application for the patent, but a patent does not necessarily mean that 
the underlying intellectual property is an innovation until it is commercialised. However, in 
general patenting signals intent to innovate, therefore it is useful as a metric for innovation.  
 
5 The United States Patent and Trademark Office database contains patent data dating back 
to 1976, and was the original source used to collect data. However, all data was ultimately 
collected using the Google Patent Search, which actually includes patent data dating back to 
1792. 
 
6 In the Hall et al. study, the last measured application years were 1990-1992. The authors 
found that 96.1% of granted patents were applied for in the preceding 3 years, and that 
throughout the years studied, lag time between applications and granting of the patent 
declined. While this potentially affects the patent counts in the tail end of measured years for 
firms that went public in the early 2000’s, it will likely be slight. 
7
 Global Industry Classification Standard. 
 
8 US Standard Industrial Classification.  
9 In many cases, firms were included in the list without a given IPO date. In others, a year 
was given, but no day or month. Subsequent web searches often yielded a date, however 
this was not always the case. Firms for which no IPO date could be found were dropped from 
the sample.  
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Patent counts were gathered from the Google Patent Database, which accesses all 
patent data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Searches were 
conducted using the firm name as the original assignee to be sure that is where the 
patent originated. Several factors were considered when conducting the search, 
including possibilities of different variations of the same company name, as well as 
changes to the company name. Online searches were conducted on the firm to see 
any mention of changes in the company’s name. Further, patent searches on 
inventors tied to firm patents were conducted to discover potential past firm names 
and variations. Discrepancies were crosschecked via comprehensive online 
searches. Patent search results were thoroughly checked to ensure the proper firm 
was being measured. Firms with zero patents in the observed years were dropped 
from the sample. The date ranges of the search were patent application dates rather 
than patent grant dates to more closely reflect the time at which the investment and 
subsequent invention occurred due to the considerable lag between application and 
grant in many cases (Hall et al., 1986). This study only considers patents that were 
granted, rather than all patents applied for by firms.  
Figure 1 – Sample Breakdown by Industry  
GICS Code  Industry   Frequency  Percent  
30302010  Personal Products10  3  1.5  
35101010  Healthcare Equipment  57  28.2  
35101020  Healthcare Supplies  24  11.9  
35102015  Healthcare Services  1  .5  
35103010  Health Care Technology  3  1.5  
35201010  Biotechnology  80  39.6  
35202010  Pharmaceuticals  28  13.9  
35203010  Life Sciences & Tools  6  3.0  
Total    202  100.0  
Ultimately, an N of 202 firms is available to test the hypothesis. The breakdown of 
firm types can be seen in Table 1. GICS codes are used to classify the firms by 
industry for consistency.  
3.5. Results  
The aggregate mean and individual models are run on four different samples of the 
dataset. The first set contains patent figures for all 202 firms in order to discover the 
overall patenting trends before and after the IPO. The second subset is referred to 
as “intensive innovators”, and includes the most innovative overall firms in the 
dataset. The third subset contains firms that were relatively innovative prior to the  
                                            
10 Personal products industry includes firms who produce toiletries, personal hygienic, and 
birth control products.  
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IPO, called “first-half innovators”. The fourth subset includes firms that remained 
innovative following the IPO, called “second-half innovators”. The justification for 
differentiating between these various subsets will be discussed.  
3.5.1. Total Sample Models  
The following models contain aggregate mean and individual data from the total 
sample of 202 firms. From this, the overall patent intensity is shown over time. As 
shown in Figure 2, the linear equation has a p value of .005 allowing for rejection of 
the null hypothesis, thus yielding a statistically significant variation in patenting over 
the observed period of 3 years prior to through nine years following the IPO. The r 
square suggests this model accounts for 50.4% of variation in the observed data. 
The cubic equation yields a p value of .001, again allowing for rejection of the null 
hypothesis, meaning a statistically significant variance in patenting over the 
observed period exists. The r square figure suggests that this cubic regression 
model accounts for 85.9% of variance in patenting.  
Figure 2 - Total Sample Mean Patent Output: Model Summary  
Dependent Variable: Patents_mean_1  
Equation  
Model Summary  Parameter Estimates  
R Square  F  df1  df2  Sig.  Constant  b1  b2  b3  
Linear  
.504  
.859  
10.152  1  10  .010  1.949  .127    
-.097  
  
Cubic  16.312  3  8  .001  .486  .907  .003  
The independent variable is Year.   
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Figure 3 - Total Sample Mean Patent Output11  
  
Figure 3 maps the regression equations. The linear model conflicts with the 
hypothesis, showing an increase in patenting over time. Conversely, the cubic 
equation curve shows rapid growth in patenting in the three years preceding the IPO 
through two years following, when growth slows. In the fourth year following the IPO, 
patent numbers begin a subtle decline before levelling off nine years following. The 
cubic model, which is more robust than the linear model, therefore lends support to 
the hypothesis.  
The next models measure all observed patent figures per year for each firm in the 
sample, rather than the entire samples per year mean patent figures. As shown in 
Figure 4, both the linear and cubic equations are statistically significant, allowing for 
rejection of the null hypothesis. The linear equation’s r square suggests this model 
accounts for 0.7% of variance in observed data. The cubic equation’s r square is 
similarly low, accounting for 1.2% of variance in observed data.  
                                            
11 In SPSS, years were recorded as positive figures. In the charts year 1 corresponds with 3 
years prior to the IPO, and year 12 corresponds with 9 years following the IPO.  
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Figure 4 - Total Sample Individual Patent Output: Model Summary  
Dependent Variable: Patents  
Equation  
Model Summary  Parameter Estimates  
R Square  F  df1  df2  Sig.  Constant  b1  b2  b3  
Linear  
.007  
.012  
16.487  1  2422  
.000  
.000  
1.949 
.486  
.127    
-.097  
  
Cubic  9.413  3  2420  .907  .003  
The independent variable is Year.   
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Figure 5 - Total Sample Individual Patent Output  
  
The regression models in Figure 5, which take into account individual patent 
observations, yield little information. The linear model reflects a slight increase in 
patenting activity over time, again conflicting with the hypothesis. The cubic 
equation, on the other hand shows a slight increase in patent output until four years 
following the IPO, before a gradual decline begins. Despite being statistically 
significant, these models are quite weak.  
A factor contributing to the weakness of these models is the variance in patenting 
outputs among firms. For instance, in year eight following the IPO, one firm produced 
nearly 90 patents. However, most observations fall below 20 patents per year, and in 
many cases firms recorded zero patents for a given year. This floor for observations 
produces a weak model, especially when compared to the quite robust mean 
patenting models. Attempts to rectify this measurement issue were problematic. The 
only approach that improved the individual measurement models had mixed results, 
and is done by measuring patent counts per year as a percentage of the firms patent 
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output in the overall observed period. The models conducted on subsets of the data 
sample all showed improvements to the model fit by using this method, though the 
overall sample model worsened. Therefore, in the following sections, the individual 
observation models utilise patents per year as a percentage of the firm’s overall 
patent output in the measured years, referred to patents as percentage of total.12  
3.5.2. Intensive Innovators  
Intensive innovators include firms in roughly the top 50th percentile of overall 
patenting activity throughout the twelve observed years, translating to all firms with 
twenty plus total patents. This allows for analysis of firms with relatively greater 
innovative capacity or focus, which serves two purposes. First, it rids the data of 
many of the zero observations to try and reveal a more robust individual patent 
observation regression model. Second, it allows for observation of firms that are 
relatively inclined to innovate to discover if they are more affected by the IPO. As 
shown in Figure 6, the linear equation shows statistical significance indicated by the 
p value of .005, allowing for rejection of the null hypothesis. The r square suggests 
this model accounts for 57% of variation in the observed data. The cubic equation is 
also significant, with a p value of .001. The r squared indicates that 85.4% of 
variance is accounted for in this model.  
  
Figure 6 - Intensive Innovators Mean Patent Output: Model Summary 
Dependent Variable: InnovatorPatents_mean  
Equation  
Model Summary  Parameter Estimates  
R Square  F  df1  df2  Sig.  Constant  b1  b2  b3  
Linear  
.570  
.854  
13.254  
1  
3  
10  .005  3.213  
.265  
1.690  
  
-.182  
  
Cubic  15.647  8  .001  .580  .006  
The independent variable is Year.  
  
                                            
12 For example, if a firm had 100 patents in the 12 years of measurements this study takes 
into account, then their year one observed patent total of 15 would yield a measure of 0.15, 
year two observation of 8 patents would yield a measure of 0.08, etc.  
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Figure 7 - Intensive Innovators Mean Patent Output  
  
The regression curves in Figure 7 are similar to that of the overall sample. The linear 
equation suggests an overall growth in patent activity for the relatively 
innovationintensive firms, detracting from the hypothesis. However, the cubic 
equation, a better-fit model, reveals pre-IPO rapid growth in innovation intensity that 
levels off four years after the IPO, followed by a slight decline, and finally an uptick 
nine years after going public.  
Turning attention to individual yearly patents as percentage of total models yields 
statistical significance for both the linear and cubic equations, with p values of .000, 
shown in Figure 8. The linear equation’s r square suggests this model accounts for  
3.3% of variance, while the cubic model is slightly greater at 5.8% of variance.  
Though significant, the individual models again yield weak results.  
Figure 8 - Intensive Innovators Individual Patent as Percentage of Total Output: Model 
Summary  
Dependent Variable: PatentsAPOT  
  29 
Equation   
Model Summary  
 
Parameter Estimates  
 
R Square  F  df1  df2  Sig.  Constant  b1  b2  b3  
Linear  .033  41.486  1  1198  .000  .057  .004  
    
Cubic  .058  24.328  3  1196  .000  .004  .034  -.004  .000  
The independent variable is Year.  
  
Figure 9 - Intensive Innovators Individual Patent as Percentage of Total Output  
  
Observing the regression curves in Figure 9, the linear model again suggests an 
overall rise in the number of patents over time, while the cubic model suggests that 
growth in patent output peaks three years following the IPO, before a gradual 
decline, again with a slight uptick nine years after the IPO.  
3.5.3. First Half Innovator Models  
This subset contains firms classified as “first half innovators” classified as firms in the 
top 50th percentile of total patenting output in the first six years of collected data. In 
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other words, these firms were relatively innovative in the years preceding and 
immediately following the IPO. This allows for analysis of whether relatively 
innovative firms prior to an IPO are more or less affected by the IPO.  
Results in Figure 10 shows that the linear equation for this subset is below the 
minimum statistical significance threshold, and thus the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. While it would indicate an overall growth in patent intensity over time, the r 
square also indicates that it accounts for only 32.3% of variance in the model, and is 
regardless dropped from analysis. The cubic equation however meets the statistical 
significance threshold, with a p value of .005, and the r square indicates this model 
accounts for 78.2% of variance.  
Figure 10 - First-Half Innovators Mean Patent Output: Model Summary 
Dependent Variable: FirstHalfInnovMean  
Equation  
Model Summary  Parameter Estimates  
R Square  F  df1  df2  Sig.  Constant  b1  b2  b3  
Linear  
Cubic  
.323  
.782  
4.766  1  10  
.054  
.005  
3.622  
.175  
1.863  
  
-.222  
  
9.557  3  8  .574  .008  
The independent variable is Year.   
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Figure 11 - First-Half Innovators Mean Patent Output  
  
The cubic model reveals a steady growth in patent grants until three years following 
the IPO, followed by a noticeable decline in patenting through nine years after, more 
so than models from other data subsets. Obviously a selection bias issue exists 
because these firms were picked specifically for their innovative intensity prior to the 
IPO, and thus comparisons against the other data subsets is problematic. What it 
does show is that innovation-intensive firms prior to going public see rapid expansion 
of their innovation output, only to experience a decline three years after going public.  
Figure 12 - First-Half Innovator Individual Patent as Percentage of Total Output: Model 
Summary  
Dependent Variable: PatentsAPOT  
Equation  
 
Model Summary  
 
Parameter Estimates  
 
  
R Square  F  df1  df2  Sig.  Constant  b1  b2  b3  
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Linear  .000  .369  1  1210  .544  .081  .000  
    
Cubic  .040  16.963  3  1208  .000  .006  .044  -.006  .000  
The independent variable is Year.  
  
Figure 13 - First-Half Innovators Individual Patent as Percentage of Total Output  
  
The individual models again use yearly patents as a percentage of the firm’s total to 
quantify changes in patenting output. Figure 12 displays a linear model with a p 
value of .544, suggesting there is no statistically significant linear change in overall 
patent output of first-half innovators, and this model is dropped from the analysis. 
The cubic equation on the other hand has a p value of .000, and is thus statistically 
significant. The r square is again low for the individual model, capturing only 4% of 
variance. However, the individual trend is certainly similar to the mean patenting 
trend, with firms improving their innovative output pre-IPO, and the actual decline 
beginning a slightly earlier at two years following the IPO before levelling off and 
slightly increasing in the eighth and ninth years following the IPO.  
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3.5.4. Second Half Innovator Models  
This subset contains firms classified as “second half innovators” and is comprised of 
firms in the top 50th percentile of total patenting output in the last six years of 
observed data. This will determine whether or not firms that were relatively 
innovative following the IPO were also comparatively innovative previously. Roughly 
40% of firms fall into both first-half and second-half innovator categories, and 78% of 
firms that were relatively innovative prior to the IPO remained innovative following it. 
The linear and cubic equations, shown in Figure 14, are statistically significant, with 
a p value of .001 and .000 respectively. The linear equation’s r square suggests this 
model accounts for 67.9% of variance, while the cubic equation accounts for 89.1% 
of variance.  
Figure 14 - Second-Half Innovators Mean Patent Output: Model Summary  
Dependent Variable: SecondHalfInnovMean  
Equation  
Model Summary  Parameter Estimates  
R Square  F  df1  df2  Sig.  Constant  b1  b2  b3  
Linear  
.679  
.891  
21.110  1  10  
.001  
.000  
2.820  
.305  
1.300  
  
  
.003  Cubic  21.750  3  8  .785  -.106  
The independent variable is Year.  
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Figure 15 - Second-Half Innovators Mean Patent Output  
  
Once again, selection bias of firms with relatively greater patent output in the latter 
years of the observation period limits the effectiveness of comparison with other 
models. However, on its own some details can be gleaned regarding firms that 
remain relatively innovative in the post-IPO period. As shown in Figure 15, the linear 
equation indicates a sharp overall increase in patent output over the observed 
period. The stronger cubic model, however, shows a broadly similar patent trajectory 
as the other models. There is a rapid growth in patent output, which slows down four 
years after the IPO. Between six and seven years following the IPO, this patent 
output begins a gradual decline through the end of the observation period. This 
suggests that even the firms that remain relatively innovative following the IPO do 
see an eventual decline in patent intensity.  
The individual yearly patent as percentage of total models yields significant results 
for both the linear and cubic equations, with p values of .000, shown in Figure 16.  
The linear model’s r square suggests it accounts for 8.2% of variation, while the 
cubic equation is slightly stronger, accounting for 10% of variation. Like other 
individual models, these results are quite weak.  
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Figure 16 - Second-Half Innovator Individual Patent as Percentage of Total Output: Model 
Summary  
Dependent Variable: PatentsAPOT  
Equation   
Model Summary  
 
Parameter Estimates  
R Square  F  df1  df2  Sig.  Constant  b1  b2  b3  
Linear  
Cubic  
.082  108.055  1  1210  .000  
.043  
.015  
.006  
.018  
    
.100  44.558  3  1208  .000  -.001  -4.379E-006  
The independent variable is Year.  
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Figure 17 - Second-Half Innovators Individual Patent as Percentage of Total Output  
  
The models, shown in Figure 17, do closely resemble the mean patent models.  
There is an overall increase in patenting activity as suggested by the linear model. 
The cubic model shows growth in patent output peaking five years following the IPO, 
followed by steady decline through the rest of the observation period. Compared to 
other models, this decline in patenting occurs rather late, but occurs nonetheless.  
4. Discussion  
With empirical results in hand, this section presents an analysis of the regression 
models in the context of existing literature, followed by limitations and suggestions 
for further research in this field.  
4.1. Results Analysis  
The evidence gathered generally supports the hypothesis presented by this paper, 
indicating that the IPO negatively impacts innovation output in firms. While the linear 
regression models indicate an overall increase in patents over time, the more robust 
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cubic regression models show small declines in the years following the IPO. The 
cubic curves of the various subsets of data analysed consistently show a rapid 
increase in patent output in the pre-IPO years, after which growth tends to slow 
before flattening out or declining in the three to four years following the IPO, even 
with firms that were relatively innovative in the last six years of observation. Because 
these declines in patent counts are slight, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the 
IPO acts as a brake on the rapid growth of innovation that occurs prior to going 
public, rather than resulting in large-scale declines. This stagnation and decline is 
especially pronounced when the growth in firm size following an IPO is considered 
(Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). Despite growing the pie in terms of resources 
available to fund innovation, a decreasing share of that pie is being devoted to 
innovation following after going public.  
These results can be compared with empirical results from studies with a similar 
research focus. Bernstein (2012) found that patent quality, measured by patent 
citations, began to decline two years following the IPO, which is earlier than the 
observed decline in patent totals in my study. Interestingly, he found no change in 
patent applications in the years around the IPO event, in contrast to the results 
presented here. This discrepancy potentially lies in his use of applications as 
opposed to granted patents, in addition to the lack of industry focus and differing 
statistical methods. Aggarwal & Hsu (2014), with a similar industry focus as my 
study, found a 36% decline in patent applications in the three years following the 
IPO. This conflicts with my findings that growth in patenting continues through the 
first four years following the IPO, before slightly declining. Again, the use of 
applications versus grants, variations in statistical analysis, as well as my slight 
expansion of industry focus and pre-IPO investor types potentially explains some of 
the divergence.13 Regardless, my overall findings generally support those of 
Bernstein (2012) and Aggarwal & Hsu (2014), adding further evidence that IPOs 
negatively impact innovation.  
Sørensen & Stuart's (2000) study of the relationship between firm age and patent 
output found an inverted U shape relationship for biotechnology firms. The first ten 
years of a biotech firm’s life generates increased patenting before an observed 
decline. Firms generally go public within ten years of incorporation (Garfinkel, 1993; 
                                            
13 Aggarwal & Hsu’s (2014) study included only venture capital backed biotechnology firms.  
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Corwin & Harris, 2001), therefore my results are similar to that of Sørensen & Stuart, 
(2000), where through the first two years following the IPO (year ten on average of a 
firm’s life), patent output increases, and their study likely in part reflects a decline 
due to an IPO event. However, there are only slight declines in my empirical 
evidence, potentially because of their longer observation period.  
Perhaps most surprising from the empirical results is the continued rapid expansion 
of patent grants in the years preceding and immediately following the IPO. This 
reflects a pre-IPO commitment to innovation that does not continue for long after 
going public. As the firm grows approaching this event, innovation grows as well. 
However, once going public this innovation growth declines. Kim & Weisbach (2008) 
found that capital raised from an IPO is allocated over a period of years, and in the 
four years following an IPO this capital is used to increase R&D spending. They 
conclude that one of the primary drivers of the IPO is a desire to fund R&D and 
capital expenditure projects. This is remarkably consistent with the empirical findings 
of this paper, where patent output declines four years following the IPO in the total 
sample of mean patenting data. However, R&D investment growth does not appear 
to last, or becomes less effective in producing patents. This is consistent with 
findings that firms tend to smooth R&D over time (Hall et al., 1986) in an effort to 
avoid laying off the human capital in which the fruits of R&D expenditures, namely 
knowledge, resides (Hall, 2010). Thus, the IPO’s positive effect on R&D and 
innovation appears to be temporary. This fact also lends support to Bernstein (2012), 
who argued that innovation quality likely declines because inventors have less 
economic stake in successful R&D outcomes after the IPO, and are therefore less 
incentivised to create novel inventions. This is a symptom of agency conflict, where 
reduced ownership leads to suboptimal outputs in terms of firm innovation.  
The post-IPO lag preceding the observed decline in patenting is expected due to the 
nature of the IPO. Increased information asymmetries and agency conflicts due to 
dispersed ownership and increased liquidity are gradual rather than sudden. This is 
because, in general, insider investors as well as blockholders and institutional 
investors who can efficiently gather information and thus reduce information 
asymmetries and potential for agency conflict, remain owners of the firm in the near-
term. This is for several reasons: 180 day post-IPO lockup periods prohibit pre-IPO 
owners from sale of stock in that period (Field & Hanka, 2001), insider directors tend 
to retain a bulk of their shares for several years following the IPO (Franks & 
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Brennan, 1997), and blockholders tend to sell as the stock becomes more liquid in 
order to prevent dilution of the share price (Helwege, Pirinsky, & Stulz, 2007). In fact, 
firms tend to underprice their IPO’s partially to encourage liquidity and dispersed 
ownership (Pham, Kalev, & Steen, 2003; Ellul & Pagano, 2006; Zheng & Li, 2008). 
This decline in insider ownership and block holding is gradual, but within five years of 
the IPO insider-owners on average own less than 10% of outstanding shares. 
Therefore, the gradual exacerbation of information asymmetries and agency conflicts 
eventually negatively impacts innovation. Despite a tripling in size (Carpenter & 
Petersen, 2002), and initial post-IPO capital expenditures on R&D (Kim & Weisbach, 
2008), the eventual wedge between management and investors begins to slow down 
and ultimately lead to slight declines in innovative output of newly public firms.  
4.2. Limitations  
The most compelling models in this empirical study took into account mean patenting 
data for all firms measured in the given sample. However, when individual patent 
numbers were run in the regression models, though generally statistically significant, 
the results were less robust. Thus, while conclusions can be drawn that for the 
overall samples patenting stagnates and slightly declines following an IPO, less 
compelling evidence exists on an individual-firm observation level. This is partially 
due to the many zero-observations for patent grants in a given year in the dataset.  
A further limitation stems from the effect firm growth has in creating an organisational 
structure less suited for innovation. As firms age and grow larger, they become less 
reliant on fungible resources which foster innovation, and increasingly reliant on rigid 
rules, processes, and values that compromise and discourage pursuit of innovation 
(Holmström, 1989; Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). When firms conduct an IPO they, 
on average, experience a three-fold increase in size (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002), 
thus they are likely to experience pressures to adopt a more bureaucratic structure 
following an IPO to accommodate greater scale. This raises the threat that what is 
being measured does not reflect increased pressure to maximise short-term 
profitability at the expense of long-term exploration and innovation, but instead the 
natural consequence of the necessity of many firms to rely on rigidity, processes, 
and values as they grow to manage an ever larger organisation.   
Further, as firms age they perhaps make a rational choice to not pursue innovation. 
According to March, (1991), firms must choose to allocate resources between 
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exploration and exploitation. However, in order to exploit knowledge, firms must first 
produce knowledge. Therefore, patenting potentially declines as firms age because 
of a rational choice made by management to reap the benefits of prior investments 
and risk, rather than reflecting a suboptimal outcome influenced by managerial 
myopia and short-term investor metrics. This is perhaps part of a natural firm life 
cycle to devote resources towards exploitation to the detriment of exploration, and 
not a consequence of the IPO.  
Unlike some prior research, this study lacks a qualitative element regarding firm 
innovations, such as through use of patent citations as a metric for innovation quality 
(see: Sørensen & Stuart, 2000; Bernstein, 2012; Aggarwal & Hsu, 2014). This 
precludes analyses of whether, despite stagnating patent applications, patent quality 
has actually improved, and thus a firm has arguably become more innovative.14 
Further, despite the focus on industries that heavily utilise patents to appropriate 
value from inventions, and thus limiting potential internal validity issues in measuring 
shifts in patenting as an appropriation strategy, potential shifts in patenting strategy 
that seek to use defensive or blocking patents, for example, are not accounted for. It 
is conceivable that the data is skewed one way or another because of different 
values placed on defensive patenting pre- and post-IPO.  
Finally, the generalisability of this paper is limited due to the strategic use of an 
industry focus. For example, Sørensen & Stuart (2000) found a positive correlation 
between firm age and patent output in the semiconductor industry, and an inverted 
U-shaped relationship in the biotech industry. This suggests cross-industry 
differences between firms age patent output, calling into question the applicability of 
the results presented here to industries beyond those studied empirically.  
4.3. Further Research  
As always, the empirical data opens up opportunities for further research. While this 
study identifies exacerbated information asymmetry and potential for agency conflict 
as the main culprits in discouraging innovation in post-IPO firms, the empirical 
evidence is limited in its ability to convict them. While much has been researched 
into the role of these two issues in raising the cost of capital for R&D (see Hall, 2002,  
                                            
14 Bernstein, 2012, and Aggarwal & Hsu, 2014, both using patent citations, come to the 
conclusion that patent quality does indeed decline following an IPO.  
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2010), and propensity to invest in R&D (Lee & O’Neill, 2003), more research is 
needed. For instance, qualitative research into the role of investors in the innovation 
process would shed light on this issue, as would research on whether investor 
expertise in a firm’s technology focus improves propensity to be innovative, as this 
would further limit information asymmetries and potential for perceived agency 
conflict.  
Further, more research on the innovative equilibrium, or the proper allocation of 
resources between exploitation and exploration, as specified by (March, 1991), 
would shed light on this research topic. Does this stagnation or decline in innovation, 
both in terms of patent quantity as observed in this paper, as well as patent quality, 
as observed elsewhere (see: Sørensen & Stuart, 2000; Bernstein, 2012; Aggarwal & 
Hsu, 2014) reflect a rational and correct choice made by firms to reap benefits of 
prior risky investments into R&D, rather than an exogenous pressure by 
shareholders to pursue short-term rather than long-term objectives. It perhaps 
reflects recognition by larger public firms in the value in acquiring technology from 
outside the firm, rather than producing it in-house. In other words, these firms 
potentially recognise their resources are better utilised in exploiting existing 
knowledge, and acquiring radical new knowledge from outside the firm rather than 
creating it in house. Understanding this dynamic would highlight the rationality in 
limiting the pursuit of innovation following an IPO, and as firms age generally.  
Research measuring the ex ante effects that the IPO has on potentially encouraging 
innovation would be a compelling compliment to my research as well. As Black & 
Gibson (1998) argue, a comprehensive stock market that provides potential for a 
lucrative exit event is necessary for a vibrant venture capital market. Despite the 
negative ex post effects on innovation within firms, the lack of potential for an IPO 
could significantly diminish overall innovation output within the United States and 
other countries. Without incentives to take risks on young, unproven, but potentially 
innovative firms, then perhaps the macro effect on overall innovation would be 
negative. Therefore, further research on the degree to which early-stage investments 
in innovative firms is driven by potential of going public would shed light on whether, 
overall, IPOs are a positive or negative aspect of a national system of innovation.  
Finally, anecdotal cases such as Amazon exist where, despite low profit margins due 
to reinvestment of revenue, the firm still enjoys a high stock price. Amazon’s strategy 
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of reinvesting revenue in new technologies, rather than generating large profits 
(Yglesias, 2014), runs counter to the findings presented by this paper. Public market 
investors ostensibly appreciate the long-term value building investments in 
innovation that Amazon has undertaken, reflected in the stock price. Could cases 
such as this represent a broader sea change in how Wall Street values long-term 
investments in innovations, despite it generating lower profits in the short-term? 
Further research on this topic could prove insightful on whether or not a shift is 
indeed taking place, or if cases such as Amazon are unique and un-representative of 
the way in which investors continue to value firms.  
5. Conclusion  
The regression models indicate the observed firms experienced large increases in 
patenting output, year on year, through the pre-IPO stage until three to four years 
following the IPO, before stagnating or slightly declining. Though actual declines in 
innovation are slight, the evidence generally supports the hypothesis presented by 
this paper, and certainly the IPO appears to have a negative effect on innovation.  
Despite growth in size and resources following the IPO, innovative output does not 
grow concurrently. This lends support to the theoretical background developed in the 
literature review that the IPO and subsequent shifts in ownership structures 
incentivise short-term profitability at the expense of long-term value building and 
innovation.  
Liquidity and dispersed ownership, enabled by the IPO, exacerbates information 
asymmetries and potential for agency conflicts as investors have less incentive to 
take an active role in firm monitoring and decision-making. Investors lack the scale to 
efficiently gather information that would allow them to distinguish between good and 
bad R&D investments as well the necessity in making long-term, risky, and uncertain 
investments at the expense of short-term profitability. Instead, they rely on short-term 
earnings reports to decide whether to buy or sell equity in the firm, fostering manager 
myopia and reduced appetite for taking risks on innovation.  
Despite the IPO’s ex post negative impact on innovation, there are ex ante positive 
impacts in that the spectre of an IPO encourages venture capital investment, which 
largely goes to young, high-tech firms. This investment sows the seeds for small 
innovative firms to become large innovative firms. The firms studied did remain 
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innovative over time, despite the growth trajectory of their innovative output 
diminishing. Thus, the IPO does appear to positively influence innovation prior to the 
IPO, before the effects of going public slow the growth of innovation.  
What can be taken away from the empirical findings and the theoretical framework 
presented here is that public firms should find methods of minimising information 
asymmetries and perceived potential for agency conflict. While disclosing information 
about potential innovation is problematic, in that it limits the competitive advantage to 
be gained by R&D, effectively communicating to investors regarding the long-term 
value that investments in R&D creates, and how this affects near-term profitability, 
could improve investor willingness to keep their capital in a firm for the long-term. 
Anecdotal cases such as Amazon are encouraging. Despite low profit margins due 
to reinvestment of earnings into areas such as innovation, the stock price remains 
high, and potentially reflects investor understanding of the value of long-term 
investments made by the firm, despite these investments negatively impacting 
shortterm profitability.  
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Appendix – Data Sources  
1. IPO Dates  
The list of public companies in the biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and medical 
supplies industries that conducted an initial public offering (IPO) between 1979 and 
2002 (including the date of the IPO) was gathered through the Osiris database of 
international listed companies. Several results from the Osiris search lacked an IPO 
date. The author searched popular press in order to determine a date if possible; this 
was not always successful so many firms were dropped from the analysis. Osiris can 
be accessed at:  http://osiris.bvdinfo.com  
2. Patent Figures  
Google Patent Search was used to gather observed patent grants for the three years 
preceding, through nine years following the IPO. Search tools applied various filters. 
Filing status was set to granted patents, as opposed to applications. Searches were 
conducted of patents registered with the United States Patent Office so as to avoid 
duplicate intellectual property being registered with several international patent 
offices. All patent types were considered. The time range was sorted according to 
the filing date, as opposed to the patent grant date, to reflect the closest time period 
between innovation and new knowledge generation and the resulting patent. The 
firm name was the first search conducted under “original assignee”. Subsequent 
searches for alternative assignee names were conducted via search engine, as well 
as within Google Patent Search by looking for inventor crossover. Often when two or 
more inventors were common in a patent under a different original assignee name in 
years immediately preceding first available patent data from the original search, this 
indicated a name change. This, however, was cross-referenced with popular press 
as well as the company’s own website in order to determine whether they operated 
under a different name. Several firms from the Osiris search yielded zero patent 
observations for the observed time period, and in many cases a search to determine 
whether they had operated under a different name did not turn up any results either, 
and so they were dropped from the analysis. Google Patent Search can be accessed 
at:  
http://www.google.com/patents  
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3. Raw Data  
The raw data entered into SPSS for statistical analysis was compiled exclusively by 
the author. Patent figures were checked through twice in order to ensure accuracy.  
The raw data is accessible on spreadsheet via Google Drive at:  
http://goo.gl/Oi86x7  
